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NOTE
SHUTTING THE BACK DOOR:

USING AMERICAN NEEDLE TO CURE THE PROBLEM OF
IMPROPER PRODUCT DEFINITION
DanielA. Schwartz*
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is designed to protect competition by making
illegal any agreement that has the effect of limiting consumer choice. To
make this determination, courts first define the product at issue and then
consider the challenged restraint's impact on the market in which that
product competes. When considering § I allegations against sports
leagues, courts have tended to define products accordingto the structure of
the leagues. The result of this tendency is that harm to competition between the leagues' teams is not properly accounted for in the courts'
analyses. This, in turn, grants leagues a form of immunity to which they
are not entitled under any statutory or doctrinal rule.
In reaching this conclusion, this Note reviews the business structure of
sports leagues and explains why they present such a difficult challenge for
courts. It then examines a number of cases in which courts, struggling with
those challenges, improperly defined the product according to league
structure. For each case, the Note explains the mistake that was made and
how that mistake granted leagues de facto immunity. This Note concludes
by arguing that the Supreme Court's recent decision in American Needle
can serve as the impetus for correcting this mistake if courts broadly interpret the meaning of the case by looking to the logic that animates it.
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INTRODUCTION

In his opinion in American Needle, inc. v. National Football League,
Judge Michael Kanne commented that asserting that a single football team
could produce a football game is "less of a legal argument than it is a Zen
riddle: Who wins when a football team plays itself?" 1 Judge Kanne's observation succinctly presents one of the difficulties that courts face when
analyzing antitrust claims against a sports league.2 Leagues cannot possibly
exist as consumers know and want them to without some degree of cooperation between competitors. Courts must therefore take into account the need
for some coordination when they contemplate the applicability of antitrust
laws to sports leagues. At the same time, there are very real questions about
how permissive courts should be when considering sports league policies.
While the need to collaborate for the purposes of making schedules and creating rules of the game is clear, can that same justification incorporate the
passage of rules regarding apparel sales? Television rights? Intellectual
property licensing?
Judge Kanne's words reveal the courts' worrisome tendency to dismiss
as ethereal questions that have practical consequences for consumers-for
example, how to define what it is that leagues sell to consumers. Though the
way in which leagues are structured can make it difficult to determine when
they compete economically only with other leagues and when the league
members also compete against each other, one thing is certain: after the National Football League ("NFL") entered into the exclusive licensing
agreement challenged in American Needle, the price of NFL apparel jumped
substantially. 3 The view that league members do not compete internally has

1. 538 E3d 736, 743 (7thCir. 2008).
2. While antitrust allegations leveled against sports leagues can arise out of any number of antitrust statutes, this Note's analysis is restricted to claims brought under § I of the
Sherman Act.
3. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct.
2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3004479, at *7 (noting that a Reebok executive described
the elimination of competition as "a godsend from a profitability standpoint" and explained
that "[b]asic fitted caps that were selling for $19.99 a few years ago because of the price pressures are now selling for $30"); see also Ken Belson, The N.EL. Is Squeezing Discounters
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been articulated by numerous defendants in the form of the "single-entity
argument,"4 which posits that leagues act as a single entity in certain elements of their businesses and are consequently categorically immune from
the antitrust laws.' The Supreme Court rejected this argument in American
Needle, but the tendency of courts to define products from an industry perspective rather than from a consumer perspective often creates an effective
immunity regardless of single-entity status.
This Note focuses on this problem of league-centric product definition.
It argues that defining products according to league structure rather than
from a consumer's perspective guarantees that courts will rule any league
restraint reasonable without accurately analyzing the restraint's true effects
on competition. Part I provides background information on antitrust law and
observes the unique issues presented by sports leagues sued under § 1. Part
II traces the manner in which numerous courts have defined the products at
issue in sports-antitrust cases and explains how the overly broad and formulaic nature of their definitions has prevented a genuine analysis of
competition. Part III addresses the Supreme Court's decision in American
Needle and concludes that the logic underlying the Court's decision can
serve to refocus courts in the way in which they define products.
I. THE SHERMAN ACT AND ANTITRUST POLICY

This Part provides relevant background information on the purposes and
substantive elements of antitrust law. Section L.A lays out the background of
the Sherman Act and describes the questions that a court analyzing a § 1
claim must answer. Section I.B elaborates on the Rule of Reason and argues
that, just as courts define markets from the perspective of the consumer, they
should also define the products relevant to an antitrust inquiry from the consumer's point of view. Section I.C notes how the Rule of Reason accounts
for the competitive benefits created by joint ventures and explains the single-entity argument, which league defendants contend should provide
categorical immunity from the antitrust laws.
A. The Sherman Act

The spine of federal antitrust law is the Sherman Act, 6 passed in 1890 to
"curb abusive and monopolistic actions in restraint of trade."7 Sherman Act
over Apparel, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at B 11 (describing efforts by the NFL to cut off sales
by discount retailers because, inter alia, they might hurt Reebok).
4. See, e.g., Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 827 (3d Cir.
2010); St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 154 F.3d 851, 856
(8th Cir. 1998); Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir.

1983).
5. See infra Section IC for a fuller explanation of the single-entity argument.
6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
7. 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 1.02 (2d ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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jurisprudence has developed along two essentially parallel lines. The first
line, and the one that is central to this Note's analysis, originates in § l's
declaration that "[e]very contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." ' It is axiomatic that this

proclamation is not to be taken literally. 9 Instead, it should be understood to
ask "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
' This question-does
destroy competition." 10
the restraint help or hurt competition?-is the key question when courts review § 1 claims."
In most industries, this question is at least theoretically straightforward.
In the conventionally structured market, competitors are distinct entities that
are fully capable of continuing to exist and pursuing their business interests
if their competitors ceased to exist. In fact, this battle for market share is the
very thing that antitrust laws exist to protect. Through the promotion of
competition, the best and most efficient competitors thrive, consumers
accrue the greatest possible benefits, and those competitors who are less
capable of competing adequately either improve or fail.12 In this context, an
agreement between two ordinary competitors not to compete-whether
through the standardization of price, quality, features, or some other agreement-will likely violate the Sherman Act,1 3 because the agreement will
deny consumers the full benefits of competition by creating a less efficient
market in which producers have less incentive to compete vigorously for
market shares.
B. The Rule of Reason

While the questions asked by § 1 may be conceptually simple, many restraints challenged under the Sherman Act require a nuanced analysis to
determine their competitive effect. Courts have developed two primary vehicles for analyzing claims of illegal collusive behavior: the per se rule and the

8. 15 U.S.C. § 1. The applicability of the second line, which traces § 2 of the Sherman
Act-dealing with monopolies and attempts to achieve them-is beyond the scope of this
Note.
9. See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918) ("But the legality of an
agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence.").

10.

Id.

11. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (stating that the Sherman Act prohibits "only unreasonable restraints of trade").
12. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (stating that
the antitrust laws were passed for the "protection of competition, not competitors" (emphasis
omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding that an agreement between competing providers of bar review courses not to compete in certain geographic
regions violated § 1).
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4

The Rule of Reason, which requires courts to conduct an

analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding a challenged restraint
in order to determine whether it promotes or destroys competition, i" has
been universally held to be the proper tool for analyzing § 1 claims brought
against sports leagues. 6
In practice, the Rule of Reason involves a market analysis and an analysis of the competitive effects of the restraint in controversy. 17 The purpose of
the market analysis is to determine both the universe in which the accused

companies operate and the competitive pressures that govern their ability to
impose their will on the market through changes in prices or production levels.' 8 When defining the relevant market, courts generally look to the

consumer's view on the "substitutability" of alternative products for the one
in question. 19 Markets are thus largely defined by the way in which the court

defines the product at issue.2 °

14. The per se rule dictates that certain types of restraints are categorical violations of
the Sherman Act, because they are of a type that is "entirely void of redeeming competitive
rationales." Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The per se rule has been abandoned in many contexts. See,
e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (placing vertical
price restraints outside the scope of the per se rule); Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (removing nonprice vertical restraints from the realm of the per se rule).
The per se rule now applies only to a narrow set of circumstances. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules
Versus Standards in AntitrustAdjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 55-65 (2007) (tracking the demise of the rules-based adjudication of the per se rule).
15. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
16. The interactions among teams clearly provide an efficiency that distinguishes the
sports league context from those narrow areas in which the per se rule is still appropriate. See,
e.g., Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712,
719 (6th Cir. 2003); Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
17.
2004).

See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506-07 (2d Cir.

18. Id. at 496.
19. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1982). This focus on consumer behavior is perhaps most clearly explained by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
use to evaluate the competitive effects of a merger. Under the Hypothetical Monopolist Test,
regulators evaluate the market to determine whether a hypothetical monopolist, who controls
all production of a given product, could institute a small but significant and nontransitory price

increase ("SSNIP") without losing customers. U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE

HORIZONTAL

§ 4.1.1

MERGER

GUIDELINES

& FED. TRADE COMM'N,
(2010),
available
at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. So long as there is an alternative
product to which a sufficient number of consumers will shift such that the hypothetical increase is unprofitable, the market expands to include that product. Id. When no such
substitutes exist, the outer bounds of the market have been discovered. Id. The process for
establishing geographic markets is the same; the market starts small and then expands until
consumers no longer drive to the next store down the road to obtain the products in question.
Id. at § 4.2.2.
20. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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This focus on the consumer's perception of the product market is vital.
For example, while it may appear that college football and professional
football are so qualitatively similar that they would be natural
substitutes, the Supreme Court has held that they occupy distinct markets
because they attract distinct audiences that conceive of the products as
distinct entities. 21 They thus fail the substitutability test because the consumers of one product would not readily move to the other.2 This focus on
the consumer is particularly relevant in the sports-antitrust context because
the lower courts tend to define products from the supply side.2 3 This tendency

has led courts that consider what competes in a market to focus on what the
leagues claim to produce (professional sports) rather than on what the public
actually consumes (live games, merchandise, etc.) 24
C. Joint Ventures and the Single-Entity Defense

When the focus shifts from a conventional industry model to that of a
sports league, the court must take note of certain considerations.2 The major
American sports leagues are each made up of approximately thirty inde2
pendently owned companies 26 and are usually classified as joint ventures.

1

Unlike traditional markets in which the players are pure competitors that can
exist independent of each other, sports leagues are composed of individually

owned and operated companies that cannot exist without each other. In order
for their product to exist at all, leagues must create certain rules, such as
how many games should be played 8 and what should and should not constitute a penalty- or suspension-worthy offense. 29 Given this peculiar dynamic,
21. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111-12, 112 n.49
(1984). This case is discussed in more detail infra in Section tI.B.
22. See id. at 112-13.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. (Salvino 11), 542 F.3d 290
(2d Cir. 2008); Am. Needle Inc. v.Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008). These
cases are discussed in more detail infra in Sections II.C.2 and II.C.4, respectively.
25. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F2d at 1391 (describing the application of
the antitrust laws to sports organizations as "the difficult task of analyzing the negative and
positive effects of a business practice in an industry which does not readily fit into the antitrust
context").
26. E.g., Salvino 11, 542 F.3d at 294; Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey
League (MSG 1), No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
2, 2007).
27. Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of ProfessionalSports' League-Wide
Licensing and MerchandisingArrangements, 1 VA. J. SPORTs & L. 1, 23 (1999).
28.

See Andrew Brandt, Op-Ed., What's Behind Pushfor 18-Game NFL Season?, CNN.coM

(Sept. 1, 2010), http://arficles.cnn.com2OlO-O9-0l/opinionlbrandt.nfl.18.game.plan-lLnfl-teamsnfl-season-real-season?_s=PM: OPINION.
29. See Jeff Z. Klein, G.M.'s Reject Total Ban on Hits to the Head, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 15,
2011, at B16; cf GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 21 (1995) ("Team
sports are naturally collusive at some minimal level. A game or a contest is a joint output. To
produce it, the teams must agree on a set of rules governing the contest and on the division of
revenues.").
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cooperation that might otherwise violate § 1 is not only legal; it is necessary
for the league to exist.30 A permissive approach is therefore sensible under
the policy announced by the Sherman Act, because cooperation among the

member companies can promote economic competition3 by creating "a new
32
product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies." Despite this toler-

ance of cooperation within joint ventures that have a procompetitive effect,
however, "joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws."33 When
the net impact of the joint venture is to harm rather than to help the market's
efficiency, joint ventures can violate § l's prohibition on collusion between
34

competitors.

Even within the subcategory of Rule of Reason cases that deal with joint
ventures, sports leagues present unique problems.35 Most joint ventures are

formed by companies seeking an otherwise unattainable efficiency but that
can nevertheless compete on their own. Sports franchises, in contrast, cannot successfully exist outside of the league in which they compete. Absent
the joint venture, they are not inefficient competitors; they are effectively
nonentities.36 It is with this key insight in mind that leagues have argued that
courts should view them as single entities, and thus categorically incapable

of violating § 1.37

The fundamental logic of the single-entity defense is that it is impossible
for something to compete against itself.38 The first sign that courts could be
30. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization:An Antitrust Analysis, 34
GA. L. REV. 137, 150-51 (1999).
31. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "competition" in this Note refer to
economic competition.
32. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 365 (1982).
33. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); accord
Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It
does not follow that because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship there are no
competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no economies but
simply limit competition.").
34. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 1475a (3d
ed. 2010) (noting the importance of "whether the challenged act controls or affects the individual market behavior" and therefore whether the act affects competition between
competitors).
35. See id. (noting that joint ventures such as professional sports leagues "generate
distinct problems").
36. STEFAN SZYMANSKI, PLAYBOOKS AND CHECKBOOKS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ECONOMICS OF MODERN SPORTS, at xiv (2009) ("[I]n the business world the bankruptcy of
your rivals is even better than collusion .... What makes the sports business different is that
you cannot have a business without your rivals."); Robert C. Heintel, Note, The Need for an
Alternative to Antitrust Regulation of the National Football League, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1033, 1043 (1996) ("A team apart from the league would generate little fan interest because it
would have no one to play, so it could not survive.").
37. See supra note 4.
38. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) ("[I]t
is perfectly plain that an internal 'agreement' to implement a single, unitary firm's policies
does not raise the antitrust dangers § I was designed to police .... Coordination within a firm
is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition.").
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receptive to the single-entity defense as applied to sports leagues appeared
in Justice Rehnquist's dissent to the denial of certiorari in National Football
League v. North American Soccer League,39 in which he declared that

"[a]lthough ... teams compete with one another on the playing field, they
rarely compete in the marketplace."4 It was not until the Supreme Court's
decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,4 however, that

the proponents of the single-entity defense obtained precedential support for
their position. In Copperweld, the Court determined that a steel company
was incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary in a way that
violated § 1.42 Comparing a parent and its subsidiary to a team of horses
collectively pulling a cart with a single driver, 43 the Court ultimately con-

cluded that the "single entity" test adequately preserved § l's prohibition on
anticompetitive "concerted conduct" because "the ultimate interests of the
subsidiary and the parent are identical, so the parent and the subsidiary must

be viewed as a single economic unit."'
While proponents of applying the single-entity argument to professional
sports leagues "believe the decision opened the door for single entity status"

of sports leagues,45 "the Supreme Court has never decided ... how far Copperweld applies to more complex entities and arrangements that involve a

high degree of corporate and economic integration but less than that existing
in Copperweld itself."46 This open question helped fuel the major argument
against the application of Copperweld to sports leagues: unlike the parent-

subsidiary relationship, in which the parent controls the subsidiary through
ownership, team owners have "a diversity of entrepreneurial interests that
goes well beyond the ordinary company."4' 7 Given the diversity of interests at
work, the First Circuit held in Fraserv. MajorLeague Soccer that granting
39. 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), denying
cert. to 670 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1982); see Robert S. Jeffrey, Note, Beyond the Hype: The Legal
and PracticalConsequences of American Needle, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 667, 672 (2010)
(discussing Justice Rehnquist's dissent as initially being the "only refuge" for advocates of the
single-firm defense).
40. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Rehnquist's view is derived in part from the argument that the NFL and other
sports leagues advanced during the trial court proceedings. See N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l
Football League, 505 F Supp. 659, 674-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). However, the argument had not
achieved widespread success and lacked any indication of support from the Supreme Court
until Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Jeffrey, supra note 39, at 672-73.
41. 467 U.S. 752.
42. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
43.
44.
45.

!d. at 771.
Id. at 772 n.18.
Jeffrey, supra note 39, at 674.
46. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002).
47. Id. at 57. It is particularly noteworthy that this criticism was leveled against Major
League Soccer ("MLS"), which is far more integrated than any other major sports league and
consequently has owners with interests that are more unified than those in other leagues. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 E Supp. 2d 130, 138 n.10 (D. Mass. 2000) (explaining
that MLS teams exist "as part of an overarching corporate structure").
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leagues single-entity status would permit precisely the type of horizontal
48
coordination that § 1 was designed to prevent.
Given the contortion needed to twist a doctrine first applied in a case involving a parent corporation and its subsidiary to leagues composed of
approximately thirty independently owned teams, arguments in favor of applying Copperweldto sports leagues were met with general skepticism 49 and
52
5
50
were rejected by the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Eighth,
53
54
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. However, the argument finally found a receptive forum in the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Professional Sports
Partnershipv. National Basketball Association (Bulls I1). 51 There, the court
declared that "[s]ports are sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their organization ... one league at a time-and perhaps one facet of a
league at a time," because it is possible that individual teams will have such
a substantial overlap in interests that they are a single entity for analytical
purposes.56 For the Seventh Circuit, the key question was whether the restraint in question deprived the market of independent decisionmakers
without any countervailing procompetitive benefits; it concluded that there
was no reason that a league could not be considered a single entity in those
aspects of its business for which it satisfied the Seventh Circuit's test.57

II. THE PROBLEM WITH IMPROPER PRODUCT DEFINITION
IN THE SPORTING CONTEXT

While it is clear from Part I that sports leagues present challenging questions regarding the competitive effects of a restraint under the Rule of
Reason, court have faced a more fundamental and persistent problem in executing these analyses. Courts that apply the Rule of Reason to sports
48. Fraser,284 F3d at 57-58.
49. See McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 880 (D. Minn. 1992); Jeffrey, supra note 39, at 674-75 ("[Fior years, post-Copperweld cases failed to complete the
metamorphosis proponents of single entity treatment long desired, leaving the decision surprisingly unremarkable in the context of sports law.").
50. Fraser,284 F.3d at 57.
51. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F2d 1249, 1257-58 (2d Cir.
1982) (finding that "[t]o tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to escape
antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or
enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects" and thus holding that restraints should be evaluated under the Rule of
Reason).
52. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
53. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
54. Smith v.Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. 95 F3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
56.

Chi. Prof'ISports P'ship(Bulls If), 95 F.3d at 600.

57. See id. at 598--600. Of course, central to this holding was the simultaneous conclusion that leagues "produce[] a single product," id. at 598, the underlying fallacy of which this
Note discusses infra in Part II.
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leagues often improperly define the products at issue by focusing on the way
in which leagues are structured rather than on the way in which consumers
understand what they are buying. This mistake effectively guarantees
leagues effective immunity from the antitrust laws by preventing courts
from considering the effects of the challenged restraints on intraleague
competition. Section II.A describes the business model of sports leagues and
shows how different inputs and outputs seem to require different levels of
cooperation among teams. Section II.B describes National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents (NCAA), ss in which the Supreme Court
embraced the notion that courts must look to the specific element of the
business affected by the restraint when conducting a Rule of Reason analysis. Section II.C provides specific examples of cases in which the court was
unable to properly identify the product at issue and explains how this mistake effectively guaranteed that the league would prevail in each case.5 9
A. The Business of Sports
In order to properly understand the issues at work when analyzing what
sports leagues create and when they compete with one another, it is important to first understand the basic business model of American sports
leagues. 60 This Note breaks down these questions by looking at what inputs
the teams buy and what output the teams produce.
Inputs are those things that a producer must buy and consume in order to
make its product. 61 By far the largest input for sports teams is labor, which,
in the case of leagues, means the competition for players. 62 While the existence of collective bargaining has taken many of the labor issues that arise in
the sports context outside the scope of antitrust laws, 63 courts that have had
occasion to consider antitrust cases regarding leagues' labor policies have

58. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
59. This Note takes no position on whether these cases would have come out differently
had the courts accounted for harm to intraleague competition. It simply argues that courts that
make this mistake fail to properly account for the full competitive landscape and, as such, do
not consider all of the issues relevant to a proper Rule of Reason analysis.

60.

This Section reviews league business only at a high level of generality. For a thor-

ough analysis of the specific business models of various sports in both the United States and
Europe, see HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT (Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski eds., 2006).
61.
ALAN GILPIN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS 109-10 (3d ed. 1973). "Output'
in contrast, refers to the things produced and sold to consumers. Id. at 162.
62.

See, e.g., Wis. LEGIs. AUDIT BUREAU, GREEN BAY PACKERS FINANCIAL CONDITION

REVIEW 10 (2000), available at http://legis.wisconsin.govlab/reports/GREEN%20BAY%
20PACKERS.pdf (noting that player costs accounted for 68.4 percent of the Green Bay Packers' expenses in the fiscal year 1994-95).
63. See, e.g., Darren Heitner, NFL Labor Battle: To the Courts?, SPORTS AGENT BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2011, 9:36 AM), http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2011/03/11/nfl-labor-battle-tothe-courts/.
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held that the constituent teams do compete with each other and are subject
to antitrust laws.64
The two primary outputs from which leagues generate their revenue are
television (in the form of payments for broadcast rights and advertising) and
ticket sales.65 As an example, the Green Bay Packers' total revenue was
$63,442,000 for the fiscal year 1994-95. 66 Of that amount, $37,258,000 was
derived from broadcast rights and $14,898,000 was earned from game tickets. 67 Teams also derive income from, among other things, concessions, pro
shop sales, and suite and club premiums. 6 Recently some teams have
sought to raise money through the sale of personal seat licenses ("PSLs"), in
which teams sell to their fans the right to purchase tickets to future games.6 9
Unlike the purchasing of labor inputs, for which it is relatively obvious that
the teams compete, it is not immediately clear whether teams in the same
league compete with each other when they make these products available to
the public. On the one hand, it seems obvious that a dollar spent on one
team is a dollar not spent on the other; so when a customer buys a PSL from
the Giants he cannot spend that money on a Jets PSL. At the same time, it is
possible that a team's interest in some circumstances is that the money be
kept in the league on the theory that all teams benefit when consumers
spend money within the league.
As this brief sketch demonstrates, sports leagues do not monolithically
focus on the production of a single product through the economic coordination of a number of distinct corporate actors. Instead, teams buy a variety of
inputs and sell a variety of outputs. Some of these purchases and sales involve coordination with other teams (such as the production of live games),
while some (such as the sale of replica jerseys) do not require cooperation
and, in fact, may involve direct competition with other teams in the same
league.

64. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(declaring the NFL draft to be a violation of the Sherman Act); see also Chi. Prof'l Sports
P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n (Bulls I1), 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t is essential
to investigate [the organization of sports leagues accused of antitrust allegations] ...one
league at a time-and perhaps one facet of a league at a time... .
65.

SCULLY, supra note 29, at 25 & nn.22 & 27.

66.

Wis. LEGIs. AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 62, at 8.

67. Id.
68. See, e.g., id.; SCULLY, supra note 29, at 25.
69. Sam Walker, Mortgages on the 50-Yard Line: Tickets Cost So Much, Fans Need
Bank Loans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1998, at W11. A less common tack with the same general
goal is the sale of equity seat licenses, which enable fans to pay substantially higher

amounts-with financing provided by the selling teams-for permanent ownership of their
seats. Kevin Clark, At Long Last, the Sports Mortgage: In Lean Times, Teams Try 'Equity Seat
Rights' to Raise Money; $220,000 for a Seat at Cal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2009, at D8.
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B. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents
As this Note discussed in Part I, the Rule of Reason is structured around
an analysis of the market as consumers understand it.7" The logical corollary
to the requirement that courts define markets according to how consumers
understand them is that courts should also define products according to how
the consumer understands them. Just as courts cannot understand how markets function without knowing what consumers view as their alternatives, a
court's Rule of Reason analysis necessarily depends on properly understanding what the consumer is actually buying.
This attribute-specific analysis is precisely what the Supreme Court
adopted in reaching its decision in NCAA. 7 1 In NCAA, the Boards of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") over its rule limiting the
number of college football games that could be televised and the number of
times any given team could appear in a televised game.72 The NCAA, in
defending its policy, essentially argued that the product in question should
be viewed as "college football" by claiming that the purpose of the limits on
television appearances was that they would benefit the sport as a whole."
By asking the Court to treat its television limits as a means of protecting
other elements of college football rather than simply a regulation on the sale
of televised college football games, the NCAA effectively asked the Court
to view college football as a single, undifferentiated mass in which all of its
various business elements combine to create a single product. The Court
rejected this argument,7 4 however, and treated the product at issue as something more like "college football television rights."" It found that the
NCAA's plan was "not even arguably tailored" to its enunciated rationales
(including maintaining a competitive balance), which indicated that college

70. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992) ("The relevant market ... is determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners."); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (defining the market according to the patient's alternatives
rather than the doctor's); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 E2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A

relevant market is comprised of those 'commodities reasonably interchangeable

by

consumers. ....'"' (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956))).
71.
72.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
NCAA, at 88, 91-94.

73. See id. at 114-17 (noting that the NCAA argued in favor of its restraint by claiming
that it protected, inter alia, attendance at nontelevised games and competitive balance).
74. Id. at 120. While the Court rejected this argument in NCAA, this case stands as an
exception to the generally receptive treatment that courts have given to such arguments. See
Heintel, supra note 36, at 1046 (observing that "the courts have given little consideration to
exactly what product the NFL, or any sports league, produces").

75.

See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 (discussing the competitiveness of "college football

television rights").
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football could not be viewed as a single, unified product but rather must be
analyzed on an element-by-element basis. 6
C. The Problem of Improper ProductDefinition

Unfortunately, courts reviewing subsequent antitrust claims against
sports leagues have not followed NCAA's approach. Instead, courts applying
the Rule of Reason to sports leagues routinely fixate on the league's structure when they define the products at issue in the claims. As a result, courts
have opened a back door to antitrust immunity that mimics the immunity
that single entities enjoy."7 Because it is logically impossible for a single
product to compete with itself, the way in which courts define the product
necessarily removes intraleague competition from Rule of Reason analyses.78 In the most basic form, this proposition is apparent from considering
the differences, for example, between defining a product as "NBA Basketball" and defining it as "Houston Rockets Basketball." In the first instance,
"NBA Basketball" can only compete with other sports or forms of entertainment, and its teams become, in effect, distributors of a single product
that is no more capable of competing with itself than Kleenex or Pepsi. In
contrast, "Houston Rockets Basketball" is an entity that might be forced to
compete with other teams within the National Basketball Association
("NBA") (such as for the loyalty and business of fans in western Louisiana
whose houses are a similar distance from Houston and New Orleans and
who can choose between the Rockets and the New Orleans Hornets). The
inevitable result of excluding intraleague competition is thus twofold: it becomes effectively impossible to prove anticompetitive effects, and any
procompetitive benefits will be sufficient to justify the challenged restraint.
Unfortunately, courts that have "attempt[ed] to define the product of
leagues [have] do[ne] so through generalizations that are useless in formulating the type of specific analysis required for application of antitrust
law." 79 They generically declare that the product at issue is a combination of
the league's initials and the sport in which the teams compete8" (referred to

76.
77.

Id.at 119.
See supra Section I.C for a discussion of the single-entity defense.

78. Cf.L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Is the NFL a single entity ...which creates a product that competes with
other entertainment products ...? Or is it 28 individual entities which compete with one another both on and off the field for the support of the consumers of the more narrow football
product?").
79. Heintel, supra note 36, at 1046.
80. See infra Section II.C and accompanying text. It is not merely courts that have
struggled to distinguish league structure and product definition; commentators have made the
same mistake. See Nathanial Grow, There's No "I" in "League ": ProfessionalSports Leagues
and the Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 191 (2006) ("Professional sports teams
produce a single product: the league sport."); Thomas Kennedy, Comment, Will America's
Pastime Be a Part of America's Future? An Antitrust Analysis that Enables Sports Leagues to
Compete Effectively in the EntertainmentMarket, 46 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1998) (speaking of
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in this Note as the "League + Sport" definition) rather than conduct a substantive analysis of what products are actually consumed, which is how
antitrust claims ought to be evaluated.81
The single-product definition underlies the larger problem with the way
in which courts apply the Rule of Reason to sports leagues. The complex
interrelationship between teams obscures the courts' ability to discern how
teams actually behave and compete, what is actually purchased, and what
the consumer views as the alternatives with which he or she is presented.
Understanding this concededly complex economic landscape, however, is
precisely what courts reviewing antitrust allegations are supposed to do.82
And yet, by embracing the view that the NBA creates a single, unitary product that the league's member teams distribute, the courts foreclose
substantive analysis and effectively immunize the league from antitrust review, because it is logically impossible for a unitary product to compete
against itself.
The practical manifestation of this mistake can be revealed through an
analysis of four cases: Chicago ProfessionalSports Partnershipv. National
Basketball Association (Bulls I);83 Major League Baseball Properties,Inc.
v. Salvino, Inc.;84 Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. National Hockey
League;8 5 and the lower courts' decisions in American Needle v. National
Football League.86 In these cases, courts dealing with four different re-

straints imposed on different parts of four different leagues made the same
mistake regarding product definition and, in so doing, prevented the proper
analysis from taking place.
the products created by sports leagues only in general terms without contemplating the possibility of internal league competition),
81. The Economic Implications of American Needle on Joint Ventures and Other Collaborations: A Roundtable Discussion with Gregory Leonard and Steven Schwartz,
ANTITRUST

INSIGHTS

(NERA Econ. Consulting, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2009, at 3

("[Aipplication of the output test should focus on the product or products that are affected by
the restriction at issue."). The tack of viewing antitrust claims through the prism of the impact
of restrictions on consumers is called the "output test." Id. An analysis under this test attempts
to understand the competitive effects from a consumer-welfare position by analyzing whether
the the restriction will ultimately increase or decrease the quantity and quality of the product
in question. Id.
82. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 622 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[While I would not characterize our role under the Sherman Act as one of 'rambl[ing]
through the wilds,' it is indeed one that requires our 'examin[ation of] difficult economic problems.' "); see also Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977) (holding
that allegations of improper vertical price restraints must be evaluated through an economic
analysis of the likely competitive benefits and harms).
83.
84.

95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).

85. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League (MSG 11), No. 07 CV 8455
(LAP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80475 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008); Madison Square Garden, L.P.
v. Nat'l Hockey League (MSG I), No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007).
86. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008); Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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1. Bulls II

In Bulls II, the Chicago Bulls and their national broadcast partner,
WGN, sought to invalidate the NBA's rules regarding the number of Bulls
games that could be broadcast nationally. Though this case is most often
cited for Judge Easterbrook's assertion that leagues can be single entities for
antitrust purposes in some contexts,87 Bulls H is relevant here because this
assertion was functionally irrelevant in light of the way in which the product
at issue was defined. Rather than viewing televised basketball games as distinct products with unique attributes, the desirability of which are
determined by the specific teams playing in them, the court opted to track
the league's88corporate structure and define the relevant product as "NBA
'
Basketball.
The primary problem with this definition is that it relies on the essential
fiction that fans are indifferent about which teams are playing when they
make their consumption decisions. This theory of product definition must
make this assumption, because any attempt to account for the possibility
that consumers prefer one team to another would cause an impossible fissure in the otherwise unitary "product" identified by the court. That is, as
soon as a distinction is made between the Chicago Bulls and the Milwaukee
Bucks, the product seems less like that of a single entity and increasingly
like those of more than two dozen different sellers. This single-product
proposition is not only intuitively strange, but leagues89 and courts90 alike
have recognized its conceptual failings.
2. Major League Baseball Properties,Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.
91
The litigation between Major League Baseball Properties ("MLBP")
and Salvino began when MLBP learned that Salvino, a maker of branded
plush toys, had produced items bearing Arizona Diamondbacks' trademarks
without MLBP's consent.92 After it received a cease-and-desist letter stating
that Salvino was improperly using MLBP-owned logos, Salvino sued
87. See, e.g., Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 741; MSG 11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80475, at
*39-40; Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 2000).
Bulls I's acceptance of the single-entity argument is discussed supra in Section I.C.
88. See Chi. Prof'l Sports P'ship (Bulls 11),
95 F.3d at 599-600.
89. See, e.g., MSG 1,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, at *3 (noting a declaration by an
National Hockey League ("NHL") executive that the NHL has struggled to "bridg[e] fan support for local teams with interest in the sport as a whole.").
90. See, e.g., L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 519 F. Supp.
581, 584 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("[S]ports fans quite often wish to spend their money on the games
of a particular team, not simply on 'NFL football,' 'NBA basketball,' or the like." (emphasis
added)).
91. MLBP is a wholly owned subsidiary of Major League Baseball ("MLB") and
serves as MLB's worldwide licensing agent. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc.
(Salvino 11), 542 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2008). It was formed to boost MLB's revenues by

serving as a one-stop shop for all licensing arrangements. See id. at 297.
92. Id. at 294-95.
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MLBP in California federal court for violations of, inter alia, § 1, claiming
that MLB's exclusive licensing power was really an agreement by the member teams not to compete with each other.93 MLBP, in turn, filed suit against
Salvino in the Southern District of New York for, inter alia, trademark infringement arising out of Salvino's use of the Diamondback's trademark. 94
Salvino's suit was transferred from California to the Southern District of
New York, and its affirmative claims against MLBP were converted into
counterclaims. 95 MLBP moved for and won summary judgment against Sal96
vino's counterclaims.
The Second Circuit identified two primary products at issue in Salvino's
claims: "MLB Entertainment Product" and "MLB Intellectual Property."97
However, the market for MLB Entertainment Product, which consisted of
the sum total of all games played, 9s was secondary to the court's analysis.
Though it concluded that there was a relationship between the value of
MLB's Intellectual Property and a team's on-field performance, the court
nonetheless treated the market for the consumption of live events as distinct
from the market for items branded with the logos and trademarks of MLB
teams. 99

The focus of the Second Circuit's analysis in Salvino was on the market
for the purchase of MLB Intellectual Property by the retailers who determine which products will receive shelf space.1°° The thrust of MLB's
argument, which the court accepted, was that MLB's policies supported the
competitive process because they enabled the league to compete more effectively with other products in the entertainment market (ranging from sports
paraphernalia to trinkets associated with television shows, movies, and comic book characters). 10'
Once again, however, the court's acceptance of this argument effectively
presumed what was never proved: that MLB intellectual property is a single
product. Though there is no doubt that goods bearing the logos of MLB
teams compete against products bearing the logos of NFL and NBA teams,
93. Id. at 295 (noting Salvino's allegation that the joint licensing diminished the incentive of firms to compete "through [their] trademark[s]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
MLBP's exclusive power was not subject only to external challenges. The New York Yankees
also challenged MLBP's interference with their marketing efforts. See Kennedy, supra note
80, at 581.
94. Salvino H,542 E3d at 295.
95. Id. at 295-96.
96. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. (Salvino 1),
420 F Supp. 2d 212
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
97. See Salvino H, 542 F.3d at 296.
98.

Id.

99. ld. at 332.
100. See id. at 330 ("[T]here seems to be no genuine dispute that the market level that is
at issue in this case is the licensing level, with demand at that level being influenced by demand at the consumer level.").
101. Id. at 299, 334 (confirming the district court's conclusion that a centralized licensing center created certain procompetitive benefits).
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there is similarly no question that there is competition between Cardinals
and Cubs products in central Illinois or between Rays and Marlins products
in Florida. Consideration of these forms of competition, however, is entirely
foreclosed under the Second Circuit's analysis. Just as it is not possible for a
unitary product to compete internally-Pizza Hut's pepperoni pizza does

not compete against its sausage pizza for purposes of an antitrust analysisthis conception of the product implies that the Red Sox and Yankees do not
fight over shelf space in central Connecticut. Thus, by defining the product

only in terms of MLB's overall structure, the individual appeal of team merchandise is subsumed into the monolithic league product and thus does not

receive individual attention in an antitrust analysis.
3. The New York Rangers Cases
The litigation between the Rangers and the NHL arose after the league

announced the implementation of its New Media Strategy, which required
the transfer of all individual team websites onto a single platform and server
created and hosted by the league.'0° Madison Square Garden ("MSG"), the

Rangers' owner, alleged that this restraint violated § 1 because it was "not
reasonably necessary for the success of the NHL venture." 1 3 The league,
relying on the district courts' decisions in Salvino and American Needle,

contended that this was simply a permissible exercise of a league's power to
promote its product against other forms of entertainment." ° The court, in
denying the Rangers' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
league from fining the team for failure to comply with the transfer, treated
the product at issue as "NHL hockey."' 105 In so doing, the court again con-

fined its focus to those benefits that would inure to the league from the
policy and refused even to consider the prospective harms to competition
among the teams that would also result from the New Media Strategy.106
The court's use of the "League + Sport" model is further evidenced by

its description of the New Media Strategy as an "intrabrand restraint[]."' 0 7
102. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League (MSG 1),No. 07 CV 8455
(LAP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, at *1-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007).
103. Id. at *14-15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Brief for Defendants-Appellees National Hockey League at 54-55, Madison Square
Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 270 F App'x 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4927-cv), 2007
WL 6514940 (arguing that the New Media Strategy had "several procompetitive effects" and
citing the district courts' decisions in Salvino and American Needle for the proposition that
these procompetitive effects made the policy permissible under § 1).
105. See MSG 1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, at *17-20 (discussing the need for the
league to sell itself collectively in order to compete against other leagues). The fact that this
decision was rendered in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction does not mitigate
the effect of its underlying supposition. Because preliminary injunctions are evaluated on the
basis of likelihood of success and possibility of irrevocable harm, id. at *15, refusal to consider intraleague competition can substantially skew the court's conclusions regarding the
appropriateness of granting the preliminary injunction.
106.
107.

See id. at*17-18, *25-26.
Id. at*21.
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By describing the New Media Strategy in this manner, the court brought the
New Media Strategy squarely into the realm of vertical restraints' 08-and in
so doing, virtually guaranteed that the NHL would prevail.10 9 But this result
was not reached by addressing the merits of such treatment for the NHL;
rather, the court simply assumed away the substantial questions of how consumers actually understand the market and how the teams that form the
NHL actually behave with respect to each other. While the court eventually
announced its intent to consider the question whether the league should be
treated as a single entity,"0 the league had already derived the benefits of
this classification. Because the product "NHL hockey" could not possibly
compete with itself, it did not matter whether the league was determined to
be a single entity; the residual benefit of that status had already been conferred.
The presumptive grant of an effective immunity was particularly inappropriate in this case because MSG was uniquely exposed to intraleague
competition that the court failed or refused to consider. The NHL indirectly

conceded that the Rangers, one of three NHL teams in the New York metropolitan area, compete with their local rivals when it agreed to eliminate any
stories about the New Jersey Devils and New York Islanders on the NHL-

hosted Rangers website. 111 The recognition that local teams compete directly
with each other is not isolated to hockey; leagues routinely recognize that
teams in the same geographic market are forced to compete with one another
by paying incumbent teams sums of money when new teams are introduced
into their market." 2 By defining the product as "NHL hockey," however, the
court effectively precluded consideration of the competitive harms that the

108. Vertical restraints refer to restrictions on competition that are imposed in contracts
between parties at different levels of the production chain (for example, between a producer
and a retailer). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (9th ed. 2009). Vertical restraints are distinct
from horizontal restraints, which are restrictions that parties agree to at the same level of the
production chain. Id.
109. The line of cases beginning with Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), has established virtual immunity for limits on intrabrand competition so long
as those restrictions have cognizable benefits for interbrand competition. See, e.g., Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). But see Stephen F. Ross,
Antitrust Options To Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 133, 136, 139 (2001) (distinguishing the
status of sports franchises from the relationship created by "conventional" franchise agreements.) The distinction between sports franchises and "conventional" franchises may raise the
possibility that the analysis that is used in one context may be inappropriate in the other, although consideration of this possibility is outside the scope of this Note.
110. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League (MSG 11), No. 07 CV
8455 (LAP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80475, at *38-42 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) (withholding
a decision at the summary judgment stage on single-entity treatment for the NHL until further
briefing was completed).
111. MSG 1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, at *11.
112. See, e.g., L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,
1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing that the New York Giants and San Francisco 49ers received
payments of $18 million when the New York Jets and Oakland Raiders joined the NFL).
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New Media Strategy caused for the Rangers alone and, more importantly, to
competition in general.
4. American Needle in the Lower Courts

NFL Properties ("NFLP") was formed in 1963 with the goal of promoting the league through more effective use of its intellectual property." 3 For
years, NFLP granted licenses to a number of different apparel makers. In
2000, NFLP broke from its longstanding practice of issuing multiple licenses. In 2001, it granted Reebok an exclusive license for all NFL products and
consequently declined to renew the license of American Needle, which had
been a licensee for about twenty years." 4 In response to the decision to
grant an exclusive license, American Needle sued the NFL, NFLP, the individual NFL teams, and Reebok, alleging that they were all part of a
conspiracy in violation of § 1.' 5 The NFL, citing Bulls H and other cases,
argued that its exclusive agreement with Reebok could not violate the Sherman Act because Copperweld and its progeny immunized the leagueacting as a single entity for purposes of promoting NFL team intellectual
property-from antitrust scrutiny." 16
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit agreed with the NFL. The
district court concluded that Copperweld compelled it to ask whether the
exclusive sales arrangement deprived the market of independent economic
competitors, and held that it did not." 7 Rather, it determined that the NFL
teams had, "through the various forms of NFL Properties, acted as an economic unit" and that "[t]he economic reality is that the separate ownerships
had no economic significance in and of itself."" 18 According to the Seventh
Circuit, reviewing the case on appeal, the district court's holding "was based
on its determination that the NFL teams' collective-licensing agreement
serves to promote NFL Football. And by promoting NFL football ... the

NFL teams act[] as an economic unit in such a manner that they should be
deemed to be a single entity.""' 9 The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that
"NFL teams can function only as one source of economic power when
collectively producing NFL football" and mocked any contrary argument by
comparing it to a Zen riddle. 2 °
113. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2008).
114. Id. at 738; see also Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity
To Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 729 (2010).
115. For purposes of this Note, the defendants are collectively referred to as "the NFL"
unless otherwise specified.
116. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 738-39.
117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943-44 (N.D. I11.
2007).
118. Id. at944.
119. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 739 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
120. Id. at 743. The same passage also rejected American Needle's argument that there
could be competition between teams as one that Bulls H had dismissed as "silly." Id.
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Importantly, the decisions of both the district court and the Seventh Circuit could not have been possible without the framework provided by the
court's product definition. By treating the product at issue as "NFL football," the courts found that the owners of the individual teams "had no
[separate] economic significance.""'2 That is, the NFL could not be an improper combination of distinct loci of power, because the definition of the
products precluded the possibility that teams compete against each other.
Had the court defined the product more precisely-as, for example, individual NFL team intellectual property-there would have been nothing
metaphysical about contemplating whether teams compete against one another to sell their intellectual property. Instead, it would have been a
necessary consideration that would have precluded single-entity treatment
and required a Rule of Reason analysis. From this perspective, the singleentity argument can be viewed as the final blow in a battle already decided
by the court's product definition.
III. AMERICAN NEEDLE AND THE SOLUTION TO THE
PRODUCT DEFINITION PROBLEM

The Supreme Court's opinion in American Needle overturned the Seventh Circuit's embrace of the single-entity defense. For the reasons
described in Part II, however, it is not clear that this decision will have any
impact on the ultimate disposition of antitrust cases brought against sports
leagues. This Part argues that American Needle, if properly construed, provides the legal foundation for fixing the product definition mistake that
many courts have made. Section III.A discusses the Supreme Court's decision in American Needle and elucidates the forces that drove the Court to
overturn the lower courts. Section III.B then argues that the idea animating
the Supreme Court's decision is its rejection of the unitary product definition, and concludes that the Court's logic can be the impetus for fixing the
lower courts' mistakes.
A. The Supreme Court'sDecision:

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League
Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the NFL's claim
that it was a single entity and, accordingly, held that its "licensing activities
constitute concerted action that is not categorically beyond the coverage of
§ 1"12' The Court's decision was driven by its belief that the lower courts
had "discounted the significance of potential competition among the teams
regarding the use of their intellectual property" simply because the teams
had to pool their efforts in certain key areas. 23 In contrast to the lower
121. Am. Needle, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
122. American Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206 (2010) (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 2208.
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courts, the Supreme Court found that cooperation in activities such as rule
and schedule making did not preclude competition between teams acting as
"separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests" in other
areas, including "in the market for intellectual property."'' 24 To merchandisers-the customers of NFL intellectual property-the teams represent
competing sources of valuable trademarks, which are sold according to the
individual interests of the team and not the league as a whole. 125 The decision
to collectively sell the NFL-team intellectual property deprived the marketplace of independent decisionmakers, and thus the league could not be a
26

single entity. 1

The Court did not, however, deny that the teams shared an interest in
promoting the NFL brand or that they would all benefit from strengthening
that brand. Rather, the Court determined that this common interest was not
enough to obscure the fact that "the teams still have distinct, potentially
competing interests.' 27 In the Court's view, two separate battles were taking
place. In one, the NFL teams, acting collectively through NFLP, were trying
to grow their pie by competing against other leagues and forms of entertainment.12 8 In the other, the league's members were vigorously fighting for

a greater share of that pie.'29 It is the existence of this second form of competition that is fundamentally at odds with the key insight of Rehnquist's
dissent to the denial of certiorari in National Football League v. North
American Soccer League and that led the Court to its conclusion that the

NFL was not a single entity. 30
Underlying the difference between the lower courts' conception of the
antitrust issues in this case and the Supreme Court's conception is the different way in which they conceive the products at issue. Both the district
court and the Seventh Circuit viewed the relevant product as NFL football
and consequently believed that the restraints served the ultimate good of the

broadly defined product. Because the product definition prevented any consideration of internal competition, the lower courts held that the NFL was a
single entity. The Supreme Court, in contrast, understood that the product at
124.

Id. at 2213 (internal quotation marks omitted).

125.

See id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 2213-14 (acknowledging that "NFL teams have common interests such as
promoting the NFL brand" and that this common interest partially unites the interests of the
individual teams).
129. See id. at 2212-13 ("The teams compete with one another, not only on the playing
field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel"); see also id. at 2212-16 (discussing generally the ways each member organization
acts for its own benefit rather than for the general benefit of the league).
130. The Court did not deny that the need to grow the pie was an important consideration when contemplating the application of antitrust law to the NFL's restraint. Its point was
simply that the parallel competition for a greater share of the pie precludes the categorical
immunity that single-entity status offers. Rather, the Court concluded, such benefits should be
considered in the context of a Rule of Reason analysis. See id. 2216-17.
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issue was intellectual property owned by the individual teams but sold collectively. By viewing the product in this narrower way, the Court escaped
the trap that plagued the lower courts. Limiting the case to the market for
"intellectual property" permitted the Court to consider the possibility that
such competition occurs and thereby concede the possibility of a § 1 violation. Thus, by defining the product in a way that mirrored the consumer's
concept of what he or she is buying, the Supreme Court fulfilled the Rule of
Reason's charge to consider all possible effects of a restraint on competition.
B. The Legacy of American Needle
The driving force between the different conclusions reached by the lower courts and the Supreme Court was the way in which the courts conceived
of the product in question. It is not mere speculation that the Supreme Court
rejected the "League + Sport" model of product definition in American Needle. Footnote seven explicitly rebuffed the Seventh Circuit's application of
this approach:
The Court of Appeals carved out a zone of antitrust immunity for conduct
arguably related to league operations by reasoning that coordinated team
trademark sales are necessary to produce "NFL football," a single NFL
brand that competes against other forms of entertainment. But defining the
product as "NFL Football" puts the cart before the horse: Of course the
NFL produces NFL football; but that does not mean that cooperation
amongst NFL teams is immune from § 1 scrutiny. 3'
This fundamental insight is critically important if American Needle is
going to have any meaningful impact on the ultimate disposition of future
cases. While this decision denied the NFL categorical immunity from the
antitrust laws, leagues will still be able to gain effective immunity through
the "League + Sports" product definition unless courts take heed of American Needle's animating rationale. Indeed, the Rule of Reason's analysis of
competitive benefits and harms is invariably tied to how the product is defined.132 Yet those courts that have had occasion to apply American Needle
have looked only to its holding 13 3 and its declaration of antitrust axioms1 4 in
extracting a rule from it. None have yet cited it for its discussion of product
131.

Id. at2214n.7.

132. See supra Part II.
133. See, e.g., Atwater v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 626 F3d 1170, 1177 n.9
(11 th Cir. 2010); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 837 (3d Cir. 2010);
In re Fla. Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 09-23187-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108528, at *100 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010); Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v.
USS-POSCO Indus., No. CV F 09-0560 LJO SMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92236, at *64-66
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010).
134. See, e.g., White v. R.M. Packer Co., No. 10-1130, 2011 WL 565655, at *1 (st Cir.
Feb. 18, 2011); Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 E3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Skycam, Inc. v. Bennett, No. 09-CV-294-GKF-FHM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135698, at *13
(N.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2010); In re: Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57859, at *40 n.59 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2010).
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definition, nor have any of the citing cases followed its model on this point.
While one explanation for this-aside from a general reluctance or refusal
to rely on dicta as guiding precedent-might be the nature of the cases presented, the way in which courts understand American Needle bears careful
observation. If courts do not adopt a broader reading that incorporates the
Supreme Court's rationale and views on product definition, American Needle will ultimately be of little practical relevance in curtailing the day-to-day
behavior of sports leagues, because courts will continue to make the types of
mistakes described in Part II. Leagues will continue to define their products
under the "League + Sport" model, and, so long as courts accept those arguments, courts will also overlook the threats that league restrictions pose to
intraleague competition when conducting Rule of Reason analyses.
CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court granted American Needle's petition for certio35
rari, there was a great deal of expectation about what the case could mean.
And while its holding appears on its face to be a blow to the NFL, it is not at
all clear that the denial of single-entity status will have any practical effect
on the way in which the league conducts its business. At this point, the only
sure thing is that the NFL will be forced to settle or to fight a protracted legal battle in which it articulates a defense under the Rule of Reason to gain
the same immunity that the Supreme Court denied it as a categorical matter.
This battle will be shaped by how the court defines the product at issue in
the dispute. Should courts adhere to the "League + Sport" model that has
been used in many cases, the inevitable result will be a form of delayed immunity for the defendants. In the most narrow construction of its holding,
American Needle does nothing to prevent that result. However, if courts take
a deeper look at the internal logic of that case, they will find that the Court
was aware of the problem with product definition and, though it was not
explicitly addressed in American Needle, sought to prevent it nonetheless.
By giving force to footnote seven, courts will simultaneously give teeth to
American Needle.

135. See, e.g., Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument
for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a
Flawed Defense, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 835 (arguing that the Court had the opportunity to deal a
death blow to single-entity arguments by sports leagues); McCann, supra note 114 (arguing
that the case could reshape antitrust jurisprudence as it applies to sports); Chris Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Antitrust Theory of the Firm: What Will Become of
Section 1?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2009, at 1 (positing that a verdict for the NFL could
effectively obliterate § 1 altogether).
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